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The paper covers those verification provisions of EURATOM, which are thought to be relevant to a 
NWFZ/ME. To begin with, briefings about the emergence and evolution of EURATOM is useful in 
order to give an idea about how the characteristics of this region were embodied into reliable, effective 
and long-lasting regional agreements. Then, far-reaching and stringent safeguards procedures of 
EURATOM will be highlighted. Likewise, insights will be given about how peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy can become possible in environments reigned by mistrust and hostility, and can pave the way 
for further cooperation. The implications of the Western European experience for a Middle Eastern 
NWFZ will then be analyzed. Upon this analysis, several proposals regarding the nuclear non-
proliferation initiatives for the Middle East will follow the suit. 
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Introduction 
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been one of the principal causes of 
instability in the Middle East. Though, there have been instances where chemical weapons are used 
already, luckily no explicit use or tests of nuclear devices happened to take place in the region.
1
 
Nevertheless, Israel is strongly believed to have already stockpiled atomic bombs in the basement. 
Yet, the official stance of the Israeli authorities against such allegations is neither the denial nor the 
acknowledgement of the existence of nuclear weapons in their military arsenal. This strategy is called 
the “policy of ambiguity” or “opaqueness”.2 Iran, on the other hand, nurtured suspicions, especially in 
the West, with respect to the its objectives in far advancing its nuclear capabilities, over the last 
decade in particular, including uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, as to 
whether they may be diverted from peaceful to military applications in the future.  
Needless to say, for building confidence among the states and promoting peace in the Middle East, 
transparency is essential. Only then the removal of all WMDs from the region is likely to be 
materialized.  
Although, the modalities suggested for dealing with the threat emanating from the existence and 
the danger of proliferation of WMDs exhibit differences, a common view shared by the authorities is 
to deal with it within the context of a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDFZ) in the 
Middle East.
3
 Hence, on one side, the Arab states and Iran point out to the existence of universal 
conventions and treaties concerning the WMDs and declare that Israel should a priori become a 
member state to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
4
On the other side, the Israeli officials 
specifically point out to the inefficiency and insufficiency of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
Notwithstanding, they endorse the idea of a WMDFZ by emphasizing the feasibility of a regional 
approach, provided the zonal agreement incorporates far-reaching verification provisions. In these 
circumstances, a middle ground between the parties to the dispute is expected to be found by the 
establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) as the first step towards the creation of a 
WMDFZ. A potential treaty on NWFZ is thus suggested to be endowed with effective verification 
provisions, and also linked to the universal nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
                                                     
1
 Preliminary records on the use of chemical agents, both in the continental Europe and the Middle East, go back to the 
First World War years. Later, the Egyptian use of chemical agents in support of the republican forces in the Yemen Civil 
War (1962-1967) was the subject of numerous reports in those years. Libya is accused of using CW against the rebels in 
Chad in 1986 and 1987. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), use of chemical weapons has been extensively 
documented by UN investigations, including the massacre against the civilians in the Kurdish town of Halabja by 
Saddam’s forces in March 1988. See, Peter Herby, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Arms Control in the Middle 
East, Oslo: Falch Hurtigtryyk as, for PRIO, 1992. More recently, chemical agents were reportedly used in Syria against 
the civilian population both in March and August 2013. 
2
 According to Etel Solingen, opaqueness refers both to a policy and to a systemic outcome characterized by no open 
acknowledgement of existing nuclear military capabilities or of intentions to acquire a nuclear weapon, while refusing to 
commit fully and effectively to mutual or multilateral full-scope safeguards. See Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources 
of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East", International Studies Quarterly, June 
1994, 38, pp. 305-337.. 
3
 Indeed, a proposal co-sponsored by Iran and Egypt to establish a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East 
was tabled in 1974 in a United Nations General Assembly meeting, and was adopted as the UNGA Resolution every year 
since then. Though, the same Resolution used to be adopted unanimously since the beginning of 1980s with Israel voting 
in favor, no substantial achievements have come through in the years followed. However, a proposal to establish a 
WMDFZ in the Middle East introduced by the Egypt’s former President Husni Mubarek in 1995 provided a fresh 
impetus to these efforts.  
4
 James Leonard, Jan Prawitz & Benjamin Sanders, “Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the 
Middle East”, in the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Study on Effective and Verifiable Measures 
which would Facilitate the Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, (A/45/435), 1990. 
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, out of which one can draw lessons for the Middle East. For the purposes of our project, 
this paper will only take the European experience into its scope. To give a preliminary insight, it may 
be stated that the significance of EURATOM stems principally from its enduring safeguards 
procedures which were carefully designed to make them acceptable both to its member states, and to 
the United States and Canada.
7
 EURATOM was actually seen, both by its member states and their 
Western allies, as a leverage for promoting cooperation and enhancing peace and security in Western 
Europe.  
The scope of this paper will cover those verification provisions of EURATOM that are thought to 
be relevant to a NWFZ. First, the peculiar conditions under which the EURATOM has emerged and 
evolved into reliable, effective and long-lasting regional agreements will be discussed. Then, far-
reaching and stringent safeguards procedures of this institution will be highlighted. Likewise, insights 
will be given about how peaceful uses of nuclear energy can become possible in environments reigned 
by mistrust and hostility until recently, and can pave the way for further cooperation. The implications 
of Western European experience for a Middle Eastern NWFZ will then be analyzed. Upon this 
analysis, proposals for a NWFZ in the Middle East will be presented in detail.  
I. The Western European Experience in Managing the Atom: EURATOM 
1. Emergence and evolution of the EURATOM Treaty
8
 
The devastating effects of the two World Wars in the 20th century on continental Europeurged the 
politicians, scientists, scholars, bureaucrats, and all concerned figures from different fields and strata 
of the peoples of Europe, to find a way of putting an end to the hostilities among the states in the 
region and to promote peace and friendship. Due to the very fact that the 'war machine', or the 
'armory', was essentially made of steel composed of iron and coal, it was thought that keeping these 
basic elements under control, would eventually allow to keep the development of 'armories' under 
control. This way of thinking, among others, gave way to the emergence of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950, whose principal actors were France and Germany. Hence, the idea 
of a 'united Europe' practically came about with the ECSC.  
However, the very same years had already witnessed an unprecedented weapon, namely the atomic 
bomb developed and used by the United States. This weapon technology was nonetheless bound to 
spread, in one way or the other. Hence, the same Europeans who had somehow found a way to control 
the 'war machine', then again, had to find a way to prevent further spread of this 'brand new' scientific 
discovery. The Continent's land for science and technology was very fertile. Accordingly, the idea of 
"atoms for peace" proposed by the US President Dwight Eisenhower in December 1953 at the United 
Nations had to go beyond mere rhetoric. The European Atomic Energy Organization (later 
EURATOM) was created in such a state of mind.  
Giving birth to EURATOM was not an easy process politically, nor a straightforward one 
technically. EURATOM had to harmonize dissimilar and somewhat conflicting interests of various 
states both inside and outside the region. In particular, France had 'nuclear ambitions' on the one hand, 
                                                     
5
 EURATOM denotes “European Atomic Energy Community”. 
6
 ABACC denotes “Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials”. 
7
 EURATOM could not have come about, let alone survived, without the consent of its members, particularly of France, 
nor without the technological support of the United States or short of natural uranium of Canada. 
8
 For a comprehensive survey on the emergence and evolution of the 'EURATOM Safeguards System', and its political 
implications on the relations both among the friends and the foes during the Cold-War period see, Darryl A. Howlett, 
EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards, London, MacMillan Press, 1990. 
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and was equally committed to not to leave the 'floor' to West Germany in the nuclear field, on the 
other. The latter aim of France did well coincide with that of the other European states as well as the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Even though the French determination to 'go nuclear' was in no 
way accepted by the United States, nor by the Soviet Union, it was clear that unless France gave its 
consent, no talk of a European institution, which would control the further spread of nuclear weapons 
would be possible, nor might West Germany be under effective and close scrutiny. This was a 'trade-
off' for the United States, which finally culminated in its generous support for EURATOM. But a 
similar 'trade-off' was also the case for France. Since, unless the United States supported the idea of 
EURATOM, politically and technologically, it would have been very difficult for France to develop its 
infantile nuclear research program in relatively short time. Then, the sides agreed that this European 
institution had to be endowed with stringent verification provisions. The degree of stringency had to 
meet the US standards, otherwise the US inspectors themselves would have had to carry out 
inspections in the European nuclear installations. This was something the Europeans would like to 
avoid absolutely.  
Concomitantly, the IAEA was in the process of establishing its global safeguards system, and there 
were concerns that the EURATOM system might undermine this objective.
9
 It was argued that the US 
support for EURATOM had "effectively ended any chance that the IAEA would develop into a 
universal safeguards system. Once this Pandora's box was opened, little possibility remained that other 
nations would readily agree to nuclear transfer terms more rigorous than those imposed upon 
EURATOM.
10
 However, the US support was secured. Experimentation with a tight international 
control mechanism, though in a limited area, could set an example for the evolution of a tight 
universal system among nations. In a way, this report revealed the US point of view on EURATOM's 
proposed safeguards procedures as being more promising than the procedures agreed upon in the 
IAEA's Statute. Therefore, for the US authorities, the idea of supporting the European proposal 
seemed interesting, especially since these safeguards procedures were actually derived from the 
safeguards provisions contained within bilateral nuclear transfer agreements, and the US domestic 
nuclear law. Moreover, the ideas that have been put forth at the time of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report 
and the Baruch Plan were enshrined into the EURATOM safeguards provisions. Therefore, these 
provisions were much like an American cloth designed à taille Européenne. 
2. Fundamentals of EURATOM's safeguards system 
The fundamental clauses of the EURATOM safeguards procedures can be found in Chapter VII of the 
EURATOM Treaty, which comprises Articles 77 to 85.
11
 The significant feature of these nine Articles 
is that, when taken together, they encapsulate a whole range of different safeguards ideas. Some of 
these were quite novel to EURATOM and were therefore largely untested. Others were drawn from 
ideas developed in different industries. Still others did have a track record in nuclear regulation. What 
is noteworthy about all these ideas is that they are broadly representative of the entire spectrum of 
safeguards thought up to that time. When taken as a whole, EURATOM safeguards articles reveal a 
concerted attempt to mold together a coherent set of nuclear energy control provisions.
12
 
                                                     
9
 Darryl A. Howlett, 'Regional Nuclear Co-Operation and Non-Proliferation Arrangements: Models from Other Regions', 
in Darryl A. Howlett & John Simpson (eds.), East Asia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Papers from Twelfth PPNN Core 
Group Meeting, Japan, 28-29 Nov., 1992, pp: 63-71. 
10
 Charles K. Ebinger, International Politics of Nuclear Energy, London, Sage Publications, 1978, quoted in Darryl 
Howlett, EURATOM and Nuclear Safeguards, p. 71. 
11
 EURATOM Treaty was signed on 25 March 1957 at Rome, initially by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
F.R. Germany, and Italy that established the European Economic Community (EEC). 
12
 Darryl A. Howlett, EURATOM.. p. 87. 
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Accordingly, Article 77 of the EURATOM Treaty states that ..the Commission shall satisfy itself 
that, in the territories of Member States, (a) ores, source materials and special fissile materials are 
not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users,. Together with this, Article 2 of the 
EURATOM Treaty required the EURATOM Commission to ensure, by appropriate supervision, that 
nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended. For the 
attainment of the objectives set out in Articles 2 and 77, the Treaty required from the operators, with 
Article 78, a declaration to the Commission concerning the basic characteristics of the installations 
set up or operating for the production, separation or other use of source materials or special fissile 
materials or for the production of irradiated nuclear fuels. Similarly, an approval by the Commission 
of the techniques to be used for the chemical processing of irradiated materials was made obligatory 
by the Treaty.  
Since the European authorities were determined to secure the political and technological support of 
the United States without their direct involvement, the proposed US-EURATOM safeguards 
agreement had two basic features: a system of checks to ensure that reliable nuclear accountancy 
records were being kept; and a system of inspection implemented by EURATOM safeguards 
inspectorate comprised of EURATOM nationals only, in order to verify that the information supplied 
in the accountancy records was accurate.  
Accordingly, Article 79 encharged EURATOM with setting up a rigorous system of nuclear 
accountancy. To this end, the Commission required that operating records be kept and produced in 
order to permit accounting for ores, source materials and special fissile materials used or produced. 
The same requirement shall apply in the case of the transport of source materials and special fissile 
materials. With Article 79, the designers of the EURATOM Treaty satisfied both their American 
counterparts who insisted on a strict and reliable material accountancy system so as to allow transfer 
of nuclear material and technology, and they equally set up a system for themselves regarding their 
potential for nuclear trade and the related security issues 
Similarly, to restrict the intrusion of US inspectors, Europeans set on to draft safeguards inspection 
provisions in such a way that even the US authorities would agree on not to carry out their own 
inspections in European installations. Hence, Article 81 states that: The Commission may send 
inspectors into the territories of Member States....inspectors shall at all times have access to all places 
and data and to all persons...in order to apply such safeguards to ores, source materials and special 
fissile materials and to ensure compliance with the provisions of Article 77... if the carrying out of an 
inspection is opposed, the Commission shall apply to the President of the Court of Justice in order to 
ensure that the inspection be carried out compulsorily.....  
In the same regard, in Article 82, the Treaty brought clarity to the task of the inspectors and their 
selection by stating that inspectors shall be recruited by the Commission [and] they shall be 
responsible for obtaining and verifying the records referred to in Article 79. They shall report any 
infringements to the Commission. Thus, neither objections to the designation of the inspectors, nor 
attempts to retard the proper inspections were allowed to create a serious problem in the EURATOM 
Treaty.
13
 In Article 83, these sanctions are listed in order of severity as follows: (a) a warning; (b) the 
withdrawal of special benefits such as financial and technical assistance; (c) the placing of the 
undertaking for a period not exceeding four months under the administration of a person or board 
appointed by a common accord of the Commission and the State having jurisdiction over the 
undertaking; (d) total or partial withdrawal of source material or special fissile materials.
14
 The scope 
                                                     
13
 As has been the case for the IAEA safeguards procedures, such 'tools' can very well be exploited by most of the 'nuclear 
going' states in order to gain time to hide their secrets. Even under the terms of the UNSC Resolution 687, Iraqi 
authorities 'dragged their feet' either by objecting to the inspectors or by not giving them proper 'escort' services to 
transfer the teams to the inspection sites. 
14
 The last sanction, which meant the confiscation of the precious assets of the violating party, is quite severe and thus of a 
deterring nature. 
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of application of EURATOM safeguards is elucidated in Article 84, which satisfied the French that 
nothing in the Treaty would preclude them from developing their atomic explosive device. Hence, 
Article 84 gave way to the French military nuclear program by not extending the application of 
safeguards to materials intended to meet defence requirements. As Lawrence Scheinman stated, no 
article of the Treaty limited a nation's right to use atomic energy for military purposes.
15
 The United 
Kingdom and France thus stand as the two-and only nuclear weapons states (NWS) party to the 
EURATOM Treaty. One important feature of the EURATOM Treaty is that, with Article 52 in 
Chapter VI, it provides the basis for the establishment of the Supply Agency by stating that the Agency 
shall have a right of option on ores, source or special fissile materials produced in the territories of 
the Member States ... Similarly, with Article 86 in Chapter VIII of the EURATOM Treaty, it is 
decided that the special fissile materials shall be the property of the Community. In the same regard, 
Article 88 stated that the Agency shall keep a special account in the name of the Community, called 
Special Fissile Materials Financial Account..  
i. Commission regulations 
The EURATOM Treaty was signed in 1957, but some additional regulations were required to put it 
into effect. Thus, in 1959 and 1960 the Commission of the European Communities adopted two 
Regulations (7 & 8), which formally started the operation of the terms of the Treaty.  
The Commission Regulation 7 provided for the Commission to determine the procedure for 
completing the declarations laid down in Article 78 of the Treaty.
16
 Accordingly, Member States were 
required to provide the Commission with the following information: the type of the reactor and its 
principal use; its thermal power rating; its fuels (composition and enrichment of fissile material); brief 
description and general plans for the installation; the technical processes employed. The Commission 
Regulation 8, on the other hand, aimed at providing the guidelines for proper implementation of the 
terms of the Article 79. It thus required operators to furnish information concerning the details of their 
stocks and movements of ores, source materials and special fissile materials. It would then be possible 
to detect any loss or diversion of nuclear materials during the inspections.  
ii. The age of the NPT and EURATOM 
In the second half of 1960s and early 1970s, the NPT and its safeguards procedures to be implemented 
by the IAEA were of much concern for the authorities of both the IAEA and EURATOM. With the 
entry into the force of the NPT, the IAEA would be mandated to carry out safeguards inspections in 
the territories of the non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty. However, EURATOM's 
inspections were already underway in the territories of the European Community Member States. 
Therefore, the latter's regional safeguards would be likely to cause considerable problems to the 
universal aspirations of the former unless an effective way could be found for them to co-exist.  
The problem was mainly two-folds: First, was the nature of the safeguards procedures to be applied 
to the EURATOM countries; and second, the organization to be entrusted with the responsibility of 
implementing these safeguards. Accordingly, a question arose: would EURATOM survive to the 
existence of the IAEA? However, West Germany and Italy strongly opposed to the abolishment of 
EURATOM, while the Benelux countries tended to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But in 
general, the EURATOM authorities' view was to keep their primary responsibility of carrying 
safeguards, while letting the IAEA act as a verifier. 
                                                     
15
 Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1965, pp: 185-186, quoted in Howlett, EURATOM... p. 96. 
16
 See the Official Journal of the European Communities - Special Edition 1959-1962 (November 1972), p. 23.  
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Nevertheless, the IAEA authorities thought in a totally different way. According to them, 
EURATOM had to forgo its safeguarding role and leave the floor to the IAEA's safeguards 
implementation. . 
Even by the time the NPT was signed in 1968, the IAEA-EURATOM safeguards issue had still not 
been resolved. However, Article III of the NPT, that was eventually agreed, did include an 
acknowledgement of regional safeguards systems, thus giving an official recognition (if somewhat 
obliquely) to EURATOM's continued safeguards existence.
17
 Paragraph 4 of Article III states that non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other 
States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  
In May 1970, the IAEA Board of Governors established the Safeguards Committee to determine 
the essentials of a standard (model) agreement to be applicable to the non-nuclear weapon states party 
to the NPT. The result was the Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States 
Required in Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, namely the 
INFCIRC/153. Accordingly, following the negotiations between the IAEA and EURATOM, both 
sides agreed on a document designated as INFCIRC/193. In July 1972, the non-nuclear weapon states 
of the European Community (i.e., West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), 




The safeguards arrangements were put into force in May 1975 with the ratification by all the non-
nuclear-weapon states of the Community. They t required the states party to the Treaty to set up a 
State's System of Accounting for and Control of (SSAC) nuclear materials (paragraph 32), then the 
EURATOM became the SSAC for the INFCIRC/193.  
iii. IAEA inspections. 
The IAEA was entitled, by the terms of INFCIRC/193, to conduct three different types of on-site 
inspections in the nuclear installations of the EURATOM Member States: First, ad hoc inspections, as 
stated in Article 71, in order to: (a) Verify the information contained in the initial report... (b) Identify 
and verify if possible the quantity and composition of nuclear material ..... Secondly, routine 
inspections, as stated in Article 72, in order to: (a) Verify that reports are consistent with records; (b) 
Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material subject to safeguards.... 
(c) Verify information on the possible causes of material unaccounted. Third, IAEA could conduct 
special inspections, as stated in Article 73, in order to: (a) .... verify the information contained in 
special reports; or (b) If the Agency considers that the information made available by the 
Community … is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities.  
With the entry into force of the INFCIRC/193, the overall scope of the safeguards provisions 
differed from those readily established in the EURATOM Treaty. The EURATOM and the IAEA 
gained experience for decades by applying safeguards jointly, and eventually developed much 
smoother relations in comparison with the past.  
                                                     
17
 Howlett, EURATOM..., ibid., p. 137. 
18
 Ibid., p. 151. 
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II. Proposals for Managing the Atom in the Middle East  
1. Implications of EURATOM for a NWFZ/ME 
The effective implementations of the safeguards procedures of EURATOM suggest that, if a 
safeguards system is to be acceptable to the potential members of a zone, its inspections procedures 
should be far more rigorous and intrusive than the existing IAEA safeguards inspections under the 
NPT. The overall set of verification provisions should enable the inspectors of the regional verification 
organization to have access to all places at all times to carry out their job during the ad hoc, routine 
and challenge inspections. Furnishing regular and detailed information about the operations in the 
facilities, and the transfers of nuclear materials out of and into the states should be among the basic 
undertakings of the member states. Moreover, the regional organization should have the sole 
ownership right of the fissile materials within the zone. Likewise, the regional organization must have 
the authority and the capacity to effectively sanction the violators.  
EURATOM experience suggests the importance of certain processes which significantly 
contributed to creating a climate of mutual confidence. These included the highly public reciprocal 
head-of-state negotiations of the treaty, the relative integration of governance structures under one 
Commission, advance notification of significant nuclear developments by member-states, a long 
pattern of technical exchanges producing considerable rapport between the nuclear energy 
commissions, and the creation of a parallel Common Market that integrated other aspects of European 
economies. These actions preceded and ultimately paved the way for substantive bilateral, regional 
and international non-proliferation agreements.
19
 
2. Suggestions for the organizational framework of a NWFZ 
The ways and means of using nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes in Western Europe have 
prompted certain proposals for the Middle East in the same regards. For the organizational framework 
establishment of two institutions is essential, namely the Council and the Supply Agency.  
i. The Council 
First a Council endowed with the necessary authority and the responsibility to execute the terms of the 
zonal agreement is suggested. To fulfill this task, the Middle East Council for Controlling Atomic 
Energy (MECCAE) is proposed.
20
 The Council, namely the MECCAE, is suggested to consist of a 
representative number of seats, preferably seven, with one permanent seat, with no right of veto, for 
Iran, Israel, and Egypt, regarding the non-Arab identities and significant nuclear engagements of the 
former two, and the political weight of the latter in the Arab world and in the NWFZ issue. The 
remaining four seats may be distributed based on some geographical criteria agreed upon in a General 
Conference. The term of the MECCAE members may be three or four years. The elections for the four 
non-permanent seats may be so arranged that their holders alternate among different Arab States at the 
end of each term. The decisions of MECCAE concerning compliance/non-compliance disputes, and 
the decisions upon the requests of any state party on non-routine inspections to be conducted in any 
other state party, should be taken by a majority of four out of seven (equivalent to a ratio slightly more 
than 57%). To execute verification, MECCAE should designate a specific number of inspectors (a 
pool) each chosen unanimously so that no state party to the NWFZ subject of a routine or non-routine 
inspection should object to the inspectors and cause delay in inspections. For each inspection, whether 
                                                     
19
 John R. Redick, et al., 
20
 The author's sole purpose in associating the name of the Council with the name of a city which is of utmost importance 
for, and the most respected in the Muslim world, is to make a virtuous start, and emphasize that the guiding principle of 
the zonal agreement will be mutual 'respect'. Throughout this part, MECCAE will thus denote the proposed Council. 
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routine or non-routine, in each inspection team, MECCAE should assign at least one inspector being 
the national of the inspected state.  
ii. The Supply Agency 
As another important institution, the establishment of a Supply Agency is suggested. The Agency 
should have the exclusive right to hold the special fissile nuclear materials of the states. Therefore, 
special fissile material should become the property of MECCAE. The Supply Agency should keep 
records concerning the value and the inventory of special fissile materials left to its possession, and 
should submit regular reports to MECCAE, so as to ensure that no such material is removed from the 
Agency. The Supply Agency should also have the optional right of ownership of non-direct use 
(source) nuclear material and keep detailed information about them. 
3. Basic undertakings within the NWFZ 
Since, the primary purpose of establishing an NWFZ is to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy as 
well as providing the states in the region with the necessary and sufficient assurances, member states 
should agree to undertake several obligations. The first fundamental undertaking would be to declare 
that the states will use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Another fundamental 
undertaking would be to agree not to attack against nuclear installations and facilities in the states 
party to the NWFZ.
21
 Therefore, states party to the NWFZ should refrain from undertaking, 
encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, 
or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in other states party Additionally, the states should 
certify that they won't receive or seek any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear 
explosive devices, or conduct any research relating to nuclear weapons or tests of nuclear explosive 
devices. Moreover, the states should undertake to place under the control of the Supply Agency, as of 
the date of entry into force of the Treaty, all their special fissile materials already produced and 
stockpiled, and accept all routine and non-routine safeguards inspections to be conducted at all times 
at any place on all their nuclear materials and installations, by either MECCAE or the IAEA inspectors 
assigned by MECCAE both for routine and non-routine inspections. For proper implementation of 
safeguards inspections and verification the states should declare all their initial inventories relating to 
their nuclear materials, and provide exact locations and complete information on the installations 
where they conduct their nuclear activities (or used to conduct in the past). The states should also 
furnish regular reports including complete information, about all their imports from and exports to 
states either party or non-party to the NWFZ, relating to all nuclear material, technology and 
equipment, and reports including the data relating to the operation of reactors and changes in the 
quantities and composition of nuclear materials.  
4. Verification procedures 
For verification of the basic obligations of the states, a "Common System of Accounting and Control of 
Nuclear Materials" (CSAC) should be established. An Additional Protocol should thus be signed by 
the IAEA and MECCAE on behalf of the states party to the NWFZ/ME. There should be mainly two 
types of inspections, namely the routine and non-routine inspections. The rights and responsibilities of 
the two institutions to conduct these inspections should be clearly defined as well.  
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i. Routine inspections 
For routine inspections, MECCAE is suggested to have the primary responsibility to administer and 
implement CSAC, and to verify the information made available by the states. During these routine 
inspections, the IAEA inspectors may only observe the verification process. The purpose of 
observations by the IAEA inspectors should be to allow them to make sure that the verification 
process is being properly accomplished by the MECCAE inspectors.  
ii. Non-routine inspections 
For non-routine inspections, two categories of requests are envisaged: First, either the IAEA may have 
a request to conduct a non-routine inspection, in case: (a) the IAEA inspectors are not satisfied 
throughout their observations with the verification process implemented by the MECCAE inspectors; 
(b) any information is provided by any of the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security 
Council relating to suspected activities of a state party to the NWF; or (c) just for the sake of 
operationalizing the IAEA's principle to deter the states against possible diversion of significant 
quantities of nuclear material by the risk of early detection. Secondly, the states party to the NWFZ 
may request a non-routine inspection to be conducted in any other state party to the NWFZ. Such a 
request should be discussed in MECCAE without delay, and a decision should be taken with a 
majority of four out of seven votes. In case a decision taken to conduct a non-routine inspection, the 
MECCAE inspectors should carry out this task without delay.  
No quota is suggested for the states to accept non-routine inspections. One reason for this is the 
imbalances amongst the levels of developments of nuclear infrastructures and know-how capacities of 
the states in the region. Therefore, a common quota may not be adequate or applicable to each state 
and the installations in these states. Some of the installations may require almost a continuous process 
of verification. A second reason is that, since it is in the authority and responsibility of MECCAE to 
decide upon the requests of the states whether to conduct a non-routine inspection or not, for the sake 
of fostering confidence-building and the credibility of the regional organization, the decisions of 
MECCAE should be respected, and should be considered satisfactory. During the non-routine 
inspections upon the request of the member states, the IAEA inspectors may either observe the 
MECCAE inspectors, or they may conduct their independent inspections. If the latter happens, the 
results of these independent inspections should be compared with each other. 
5. Non-compliance & enforcement measures 
In case of violation of the terms of the Treaty, two categories of measures are suggested. First, 
regarding the level of seriousness of violation, MECCAE may itself apply a set of measures with an 
equivalent level of severity. Therefore, MECCAE may either: (a) warn the violating state publicly; (b) 
withdraw special benefits such as financial and technical assistance; or (c) withdraw totally or partially 
the source materials in the installation, and freeze the rights of the states over their source materials 
kept in Supply Agency. Secondly, even if when the above measures taken, the violating state still 
resists to comply with the terms of the Treaty, MECCAE should bring the case to the attention of the 
IAEA. Further measures will then be in the responsibility of the IAEA. Then, the Board of Governors 
of the IAEA should discuss the issue upon the report of the Director General of the Agency. The 
Board then: (a) should call upon the violating state to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it 
finds to have occurred, either by relying on the information provided by MECCAE, or by taking 
independent initiative; (b) should report the non-compliance (in case of extended denial by the 




No two regions in the world look alike geographically or culturally. Therefore, no two regions can be 
expected to have identical characteristics in political, military or economic terms, either. Nevertheless, 
these differences should by no means undermine the importance of the lessons that one can draw from 
distinct case studies. Hence, the main theme of this paper is based on such a deduction. It goes without 
saying that the Middle East has more dissimilarity in many respects, rather than similarities, with 
Western Europe and Latin America. However, such issues as the verification provisions of divers 
regional nuclear non-proliferation agreements exhibit many similarities. The scope of these provisions 
is usually a reflection of the expectations and the intentions of the parties. These expectations and the 
intentions themselves are the repercussions of the characteristics of the regions. Therefore, these 
characteristics do have an impact on the scope of the region-wide verification provisions. 
Incorporating these regional characteristics into regional agreements may thus require additional 
verification provisions, and additional rights and obligations conferred to the regional institutions. The 
verification provisions and the institutions introduced in this paper for a Middle East NWFZ are 
attempted to be in line with such reasoning.  
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